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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law/Property-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: Do
THEY APPLY TO PUBLIC BODIES?-Ryan v. Town of Manalapan,
414 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1982)
"Do Restrictive Covenants Affecting The Usage of Land Apply
to a Public Body Which Acquires The Land by Purchase as Op-
posed to Acquisition by Eminent Domain?"'1
In Ryan v. Town of Manalapan,2 the Florida Supreme Court an-
swered "no," reminding the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which
had certified the question as one of great public importance, that it
had answered the question twenty-seven years before in Board of
Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands.3 In Bay Har-
bor, the supreme court decided for the first time how restrictive
covenants were to be treated under Florida law when land bur-
dened by those covenants is acquired for public purposes. The
court held that while the covenants are enforceable "between the
parties thereto and their successors with notice," they are unen-
forceable against a public body which acquires the burdened land.
Furthermore, the court held that the rights created by the cove-
nants did not constitute property for which compensation had to
be paid in the event the land burdened by the restrictive covenants
was acquired for a public use inconsistent with the restrictions.'
Although Bay Harbor involved the purchase of land, the district
court in Ryan mistakenly viewed that case as involving acquisition
by eminent domain.5 The mistake was understandable since the
the supreme court also found it necessary to include a lengthy dis-
cussion of eminent domain in its opinion.6 In fact, the district
court never distinguished voluntary acquisitions from acquisitions
by eminent domain. 7 Consequently, while the certified question
has been answered, it has not been squarely addressed.
This note will discuss Florida's treatment of restrictive cove-
1. Ryan v. Town of Manalapan, 393 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
2. 414 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1982).
3. 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955). See infra, notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
4. Id. at 642.
5. 393 So. 2d at 635.
6. 81 So. 2d at 640-44.
7. Id.
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nants when land burdened by those covenants is acquired by ei-
ther voluntary or involuntary means. It will be suggested that Flor-
ida's undifferentiated treatment of restrictive covenants when land
has been acquired by a public body for uses inconsistent with the
covenants constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property with-
out just compensation. In addition, it will be made clear that the
supreme court's recent endorsement of governmental manipulation
of the desires of landowners who wish to avoid their covenant obli-
gations, will result in favorable property transactions for the gov-
ernment at the expense of the intended beneficiaries of the
covenants.
I. RYAN AND ITS EFFECT
Petitioner Ryan in a declaratory judgment action sought to have
his rights and the rights and obligations of the respondents-the
Town of Manalapan (Town), Palm Beach County (County), and
another landowner, Talmo-determined.8 Ryan and Talmo were
contiguous landowners whose deeds contained identical restrictions
on the use of their land.9 The Town had a comprehensive zoning
plan which contained virtually the same restrictions.10 The contro-
versy arose when Talmo, the Town, and the County negotiated a
plan whereby the County was to release its "dedicatory rights" to a
portion of Talmo's property in exchange for $70,000, paid in equal
shares by Talmo and the Town. Talmo also was to convey a strip
of his property to be used as a pedestrian easement." In addition,
Talmo was to convey another portion of his land to the Town to be
used as a site for a town hall or other municipal use in exchange
for the Town's rezoning of the land retained by Talmo to allow for
multi-family housing and to permit construction of a single-unit
dwelling with only 70 feet of ocean frontage. 12 All of the uses
planned by the Town, the County and Talmo violated the terms of
the restrictive covenants contained in the deed to Talmo's land."3
At trial, the court granted motions to dismiss in favor of the
8. 414 So. 2d at 194.
9. Id. The restrictive covenants limited construction to single family dwellings on lots
with a minimum of 150 feet of ocean frontage. Id. It should be noted that Talmo had ques-
tioned whether the restrictive convenants applied to his land. The supreme court, however,
for purposes of their review, assumed the applicability of the restrictions to Talmo's land.
Id.
10. Id. at 194.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 194-95.
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Town and County on the "ground that restrictive covenants are
not enforceable against governmental bodies that acquire land for
public purposes.' 1 4 Talmo's motion to dismiss as to the remainder
of his land was denied. 15 Ryan appealed the dismissal orders.' 6
On appeal, the district court held that it could "see no distinc-
tion between when the land is acquired by agreement or purchase"
as opposed to when it is acquired by condemnation.1 7 The court
observed: "In either case the restrictive covenants do not 'consti-
tute property in those in whose favor such restrictions exist for
which compensation must be made. . . .' and thus the covenants
are not enforceable against the public body."' 8 Nevertheless, the
court considered the acquisitions by eminent domain and acquisi-
tions by agreement or purchase important enough to certify the
question to the supreme court.19
The supreme court approved the decision of the district court, 0
holding:
With an accurate understanding of the Bay Harbor Island case, it
can be seen that the district court's certified question was an-
swered twenty-seven years ago: restrictive covenants are no more
enforceable against a governmental body when it acquires land
for public purposes by purchase than they are when it does so by
eminent domain."'
After briefly reiterating the reasons for the Bay Harbor holding,
the court discussed and then rejected Ryan's claim, based on
Thompson v. Squibb,2 that Bay Harbor did not apply.23
The Squibb case was one of two cases involving restrictive cove-
nants and the "acquisition" of burdened land for public purposes
to reach the appellate courts within the twenty-seven year span
between Bay Harbor and Ryan. 4 In Squibb, the defendant, an
14. Id. at 195.
15. 393- So. 2d at 634.
16. 414 So. 2d at 195.
17. 393 So. 2d at 635.
18. Id. (quoting Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d at
639).
19. Id. The Florida Constitution provides that the supreme court "[m]ay review any de-
cision of a district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great
public importance." FLA. CoNs'r. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
20. 414 So. 2d at 194.
21. Id. at 196.
22. 183 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
23. 414 So. 2d at 196-97.
24. The other case was Kosanke v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 256 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 2d
1983]
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owner of a subdivision, attempted to use a lot she owned in an
adjoining subdivision as a connecting street. All lots in the adjoin-
ing subdivision were restricted by covenant to residential purposes.
The Squibbs brought the action to enjoin the defendant from us-
ing her lot in a manner inconsistent with the restrictive cove-
nants.25 The defendant invoked the principle of Bay Harbor as a
defense, contending that since burdened land may be acquired for
public purposes in disregard of restrictive covenants, "then the
owner of such restricted land may make a voluntary conveyance or
dedication of the land for a public use . . . without liability for
breach of the covenants." 26
The court refused to adopt this reasoning. It reiterated the hold-
ing in Bay Harbor that private persons contract with knowledge
that "any land may be taken by the sovereign for public purposes
at any time ' 27 and thus impliedly except the sovereign from the
operation of restrictive covenants. However, the court held: "[I]t
[does] not necessarily follow that a landowner may voluntarily and
without at least some substantial prospect that some public au-
thority will exercise the power of eminent domain convey or dedi-
cate his property for a use . . . which would violate his cove-
nants." 2 Unlike Bay Harbor, the Squibb court said, "[T]his is a
controversy wholly between private parties" and the court was not
going to "eliminate or weaken the obligations of. . . covenants as
between private parties." 29
While Squibb seemed to provide an opportunity for limiting the
Bay Harbor principle to situations where the public authority is
planning to use its eminent domain power, the Ryan decision
makes it clear that Squibb means little in terms of protecting the
beneficiaries of restrictive covenants. The Ryan court limits
Squibb to its facts, that is, to situations where there is "no govern-
mental participation whatsoever," and holds that regardless of how
the transaction is classified, "there is by virtue of the agreement an
acquisition of property by a local government for public pur-
DCA 1972). Konsanke involved the City's proposed recreational development of property
that had been dedicated for park purposes. A portion of the property was restricted to
church site and villa site purposes. The court held that the restrictions were not enforceable
against the City in accordance with Bay Harbor.
25. 183 So. 2d at 31-32.





poses. '3 ° Furthermore, the court holds that it is irrelevant whether
the public use proposal originates from a private owner's plan of
development or from a public body's plan.
The supreme court does not explain why it considers the means
by which burdened land is acquired irrelevant. In Bay Harbor,
upon which the Ryan decision is based, the supreme court did not
concern itself with the fact that the burdened land was to be pur-
chased as opposed to being condemned, but discussed both volun-
tary and involuntary means of acquisition as though they consti-
tuted "takings." 31 Nevertheless, the supreme court's lumping
together of voluntary and involuntary means of acquisition can be
justified in this context since, from the point of view of a benefi-
ciary of restrictive covenants, it would appear to be irrelevant
which means is employed to acquire the burdened land. Whichever
means is employed, the beneficiary of the covenants has had his
rights destroyed when the public body acquires the land and he
would be entitled to compensation if those rights are deemed
"property."
While the means used to acquire the burdened land may be ir-
relevant to beneficiaries of restrictive covenants, the fact that pri-
vate landowners can initiate the transaction that results in the
public acquisition is relevant since it increases the likelihood that
their rights will be destroyed. The effect of the Ryan decision is to
allow a landowner in the position of the defendant in Squibb to
circumvent the restrictions on her land if she obtains a governmen-
tal body's participation in her plans before an owner of the restric-
tive covenant rights brings an action to enjoin her.32 As long as the
burdened landowner's planned use of the land is consistent with a
governmental body's power to acquire land for the public benefit,
the burdened landowner may be able to accomplish indirectly what
she could not do directly, that is, have the land put to a use incon-
sistent with the terms of the restrictive covenants by "coaxing" a
30. 414 So. 2d at 197.
31. Acquisitions of property by voluntary means, e.g., by purchase agreement, are not
"takings" in either the common sense or the constitutional sense. To be considered a "tak-
ing" the property must be seized or destroyed against the will of the owner. See 2 NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1 (3d ed. 1981).
32. According to the Ryan court, if Mrs. Thompson (the defendant in Squibb) had kept
her plans to herself until she could coax a governmental body into participating in them,
that case would have been decided the other way. This leaves the lot owners who are bene-
fited by restrictions defenseless against the individual who buys a lot as part of a plan of
development. The fate of their rights will be involuntarily and unknowingly placed at the
mercy of governmental bodies which have the power to acquire the lots.
19831
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governmental body to go along with her plans. Whether a govern-
mental body becomes interested in a landowner's plan may depend
as much on the political influence of the landowner as the practical
benefits conferred on the governmental entity through the transac-
tion. Because burdened landowners may be willing to give up much
in order to accomplish their development plans, governmental bod-
ies are likely to be confronted with offers they can't refuse." Gov-
ernments can in turn use the existence of the covenants as leverage
in order to create favorable deals for themselves at the expense of
the beneficiaries of the covenants who can do nothing to prevent
their rights from being destroyed and the value of their property
from being diminished. The Ryan case is a perfect example of this
type of leverage and it shows how far a burdened landowner may
go to free his land of encumbrances. Of course, this case involved
dedicatory rights and zoning restrictions as well as restrictive
covenants.3 4
The purpose of the Ryan agreement, as far as Talmo was con-
cerned, was to enable him to use most of the beach front portion of
his land for multi-family housing-a purpose that was in violation
of the terms of the restrictive covenants." Talmo gave up nearly
half of his property and $35,000 to do so." Nevertheless, regardless
of whether the County released its dedicatory rights and whether
the Town rezoned the retained portion of his land, the retained
portion remains burdened by the covenants. It does so because it
was not acquired for public purposes and because "the zoning or
rezoning of real property cannot in any way abolish, abrogate or
enlarge lawful contractual covenants and restrictions pertaining
thereto.37 The anomalous result is that the Town and County now
own portions of Talmo's land and may do with it as they please,
while Talmo has less land and it is still restricted by the cove-
nants.38 Meanwhile, Ryan has lost the benefit of the covenants to
33. Indeed, the defendant in Squibb was willing to donate the lot in the adjoining subdi-
vision to the public in order to accomplish her plans.
34. 414 So. 2d at 194.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 182 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
See also Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957).
38. Technically, Talmo received compensation from the Town and County to support
the agreement. While the rezoning of the retained portion of Talmo's land could not remove
the restrictions, since restrictive covenants are subject to discharge by release or agreement,
he is a step closer to freeing his land of encumbrances. Restatement of Property § 557
(1944).
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the extent they applied to that portion of Talmo's land now owned
by the Town and County.
II. BAY HARBOR AND THE MINORITY VIEW
A. Introduction
It has been observed that: "Since the exercise of the power of
eminent domain is one of the most harsh proceedings known to the
law, both the United States and the Florida constitutions contain
provisions to safeguard the rights of the individual." 39 In addition
to the requirement of due process," the Florida Constitution pro-
vides that "No private property shall be taken except for a public
purpose and with full compensation therefore paid to each
owner.",
1
The controversy regarding restrictive covenants has centered on
the issue of whether such covenants, or more properly, the rights
they create, are to be considered "property". In Bay Harbor, the
Florida Supreme Court faced this issue for the first time.
B. Bay Harbor
The Town of Bay Harbor Islands brought suit to enjoin the
Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, which had contracted
to purchase land within the town's corporate limits, from building
and operating a public school on such land in contravention of re-
strictions in the town's subdivision plan.2 The Board appealed the
decree of the circuit court enjoining it from proceeding with the
construction and operation of the school.4 On appeal, the supreme
court adopted the "minority" view or what it called the "better
view, if it is not actually the majority view," holding that restric-
tions in covenants are not "property" for which compensation
must be made in the event land burdened by the restrictions is
acquired for public purposes.'
4
While the Bay Harbor court characterized the minority view as
39. THE FLORIDA BAI, FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2 (3d ed.
1977).
40. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 provides in part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." (emphasis added).
41. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (emphasis added).
42. 81 So. 2d at 638-39.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 642.
1983]
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the "recent trend,"'4 5 that characterization appears to have been er-
roneous. The most recent case the court could cite in support of
the minority view was Anderson v. Lynch,"' one of first impression
in the Georgia Supreme Court and some sixteen years old at the
time it was cited in Bay Harbor. If the court had looked a little
farther north, it would have found that in 1952, just three years
prior to its decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court had recog-
nized restrictive covenant rights as property.4 7 Moreover, the other
cases decided in the interval between Anderson and Bay Harbor
cited as supporting a state's position on the issue, all support the
majority view." The Florida Supreme Court, nevertheless, relied
heavily on the Georgia case.
Bay Harbor, Anderson and "the [other] cases that may be cited
as opposed to compensation all rest. . . largely on one case. . . in
which the doctrine expressed was dictum."'4 9 The case, United
States v. Certain Lands,50 is quoted extensively by the Bay Harbor
court. Certain Lands involved the condemnation of land for the
purpose of erecting fortifications for coastal defense.5 1 The deeds
to the condemned land contained restrictive provisions listing a
number of uses that were to be prohibited.52 The court gave two
factually-based reasons why the restrictions did not apply to the
government. The first reason was that "the right acquired by the
45. Id.
46. 3 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 1939).
47. City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 71 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. 1952). The court stated:
[T]he decided weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports the proposition
that such a restriction, being in the nature of an equitable servitude, is an interest
in land and must be paid for when taken. The theory is that these restrictions
impose negative easements on the land restricted in favor of and appendant to the
rest of the land in the restricted area, and when a particular parcel thereof is
appropriated for a public use that will violate the restrictions, such appropriation
amounts in a constitutional sense to a taking or damaging of property of the other
landowners for whose benefit the restrictions are imposed.
Id. at 401.
48. Ashland-Boyd County City-County Health Dep't. v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922 (Ky.
1952); Burger v. City of St. Paul, 64 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 1954); Crayden v. Seidman, 87 Pa. D.
& C. 118 (1952); Meagher v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 77 S.E.2d 461 (Va. 1953).
49. Aigler, Measure of Compensation for Extinguishment of Easements by Condemna-
tion, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 5, 31.
50. 112 F. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), affd sub nom, Wharton v. United States, 153 F. 876
(1st Cir. 1907).
51. Id. at 624.
52. Id. at 624-25. The provision provided, in part: "But this deed is on condition that no
slaughterhouse, smith shop, steam engine, furnace, forge, bone-boiling establishment ...
[nor] other noxious, dangerous, or offensive trade or business whatever shall ever be done
... upon said land...."
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government [did] not appear to be in any substantial particular
inconsistent with the provisions. . ... "" The second reason was
based on a finding that the limitation of remedy clause contained
in the provisions did not provide for remedies that could be ap-
plied against the government.54 Sandwiched between was dicta in
which the court said that, as a matter of public policy, even if the
government's use was inconsistent with the provisions, the benefi-
ciaries of the restrictions could not enforce them against the gov-
ernment and would not be entitled to compensation for any depre-
ciation in the value of their property due to the public use. 6 The
court's primary concern was that if restrictive covenant rights were
recognized as being compensable, then private parties could
through "a mere device of conveyancing . ..defeat entirely the
rule that depreciation of property incidental to a public use does
not constitute a 'taking.' "5
While this doctrine was followed by at least one early federal
decision,67 it is clear that rights created by restrictive covenants
are now recognized as property under existing federal law.
The Bay Harbor court also had relied on the fact that California
courts had "long since adopted the rule which the Georgia Court
• ..concluded to be the better rule."59 It is interesting to note that
in 1973 the California Supreme Court abandoned the minority
view, rejecting each of its major justifications. 0 These are the same
justifications advanced by the Bay Harbor court.
C. The Minority View Rationales
Basically, there are five justifications advanced by the courts
subscribing to the minority view. The first two are nothing more
than conclusions and the last three are based upon public policy.
The first justification is based upon labeling. The supreme court,
53. Id. at 627.
54. Id. at 630.
55. Id. at 627-30.
56. Id. at 629.
57. Moses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934). However, in this case, as in Certain
Lands, the court first found that the contemplated use was not inconsistent with the
restrictions.
58. Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960); United
States v. 0.01 Acre of Land, 310 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. Certain Land
in City of Augusta, Maine, 220 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Me. 1963); United States v. 11.06 Acres of
Land, 89 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mo. 1950).
59. 81 So. 2d at 643.
60. Southern California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 507 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1973).
19831
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in Bay Harbor, states that "restrictions . . .do not fall within th
category of true easements, such as the right of passage, use, or
rights of light, air and view" but are more correctly defined as
"negative easements or equitable servitudes.'" The court
continues:
Such so-called easements are basically not easements in the strict
sense of the word but are more properly classified as rights arising
out of contract. It may well be that the failure of some of the
courts to recognize this real difference has led to the confusion
and the 'irreconcilable conflict' in the decisions. 2
The court does not support its conclusion that restrictive cove-
nant rights are rights arising out of contract and does not discuss
just what significance this "real difference" in their classification
has on the resolution of the conflict.
The court states that restrictions are not "true easements" but
are "negative easements or equitable servitudes" and implies this
distinction is significant. However, this statement is misleading for
two reasons: (1) the so-called true easements of light, air and view
are themselves negative easements,6" and (2) these easements are
not always recognized as compensable property interests.4
The interests that have been recognized as "true" negative ease-
ments are basically limited to those of light, air and view. The rec-
ognition of these interests stems from the common law doctrine of
ancient lights.6 Under this doctrine, a landowner could prevent his
neighbor from obstructing his access to light, air or view if he had
enjoyed their unobstructed passage for a period of time, typically
twenty years. This doctrine has, however, been uniformly rejected
in the United States." Thus, unlike affirmative easements, these
negative easements cannot be created by prescription. Further-
more, implied negative easements have been held in Florida to be
noncompensable in the event they are destroyed by a public use.6
61. 81 So. 2d at 640.
62. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
63. Easements may be classified as being either negative or affirmative (positive). Nega-
tive easements are those that allow one person to restrict another from using his land in
certain ways. Affirmative easements allow a person to use the land of another in a limited
manner. See 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 405 (1949).
64. Id.
65. Id. at § 414(8).
66. Id.
67. Seldon v. City of Jacksonville, 10 So. 457 (Fla. 1891); Bowden v. City of Jacksonville,
42 So. 394 (Fla. 1906); (both cases involved the erection of a viaduct by a municipal govern-
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In Weir v. Palm Beach County,"" the supreme court held, inter
alia, that an individual's right to view is "subordinate to the public
good and any alleged damage suffered is damnum absque in-
juria."' 9 However, while there is a lack of case law on point, the
general consensus is that these negative easements may be created
by express grant and, if so created, would be held compensable in
the event they were destroyed by a public taking. 0 This last point
is important since the courts following the majority view base their
decisions on the idea that restrictive covenant rights are indistin-
guishable from negative easements. Restrictions and negative ease-
ments share a major characteristic-both have the effect of
preventing a landowner from using his land in otherwise permissi-
ble ways.
The Bay Harbor court, as with other courts subscribing to the
minority view, is content, however, with labeling restrictions not as
"true easements" but rather "rights arising out of contract" with-
out discussing why that is significant. The attempt to establish a
substantive distinction based merely upon the labels applied is
both "inequitable and rationally indefensible."''1
The second justification for the Bay Harbor rule is as weak as
the first. It holds that, since "[tihe Constitution and laws of [the]
State are a part of every contract," and because "[e]very person is
charged with knowledge that any land may be taken by the sover-
eign . . . at any time, '72 then it somehow follows that public bod-
ies are impliedly excepted from the operation of restrictive cove-
nants.73 Of course, this "reasoning" is merely circular. It is exactly
this issue-whether the covenants apply to public bodies-that
must be decided in order to determine what the law is which forms
a part of every contract. Furthermore, this reasoning could apply
to any improvements to property made pursuant to a contract. For
example, in the case of a lot owner who had contracted to have a
ment thereby destroying an abutting lot owner's implied rights to light and air and his
rights of ingress and egress).
68. 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956).
69. Id. at 869. Damages that are damnum absque injuria are those that do not give rise
to an action in damages against persons who cause them. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (rev.
5th ed. 1979).
70. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 63 at § 414 [8]. The fact that the supreme court in Bay
Harbor makes the distinction between these "true" negative easements and restrictions evi-
dences that it considers them compensable in some situations. By the process of elimination,
the compensable situations must be those created by express grant.
71. 507 P.2d at 966-67.
72. 81 So. 2d at 643.
73. Id. at 641 (quoting 2 NICHOLS, EmNNT DOMAIN § 5.73 (3d ed. 1950)).
19831
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residence built upon his lot, it could be argued that a public body
which acquires the lot need not compensate him for the value of
the residence since the lot owner knew at the time he entered the
contract that his lot could be "taken by the sovereign at any time."
The third justification is based upon the notion that it is some-
how incongruous to allow private parties to create compensable
rights out of the "thin air,' '74 imposing a new burden on the public,
when the state has the power to condemn the land prior to the
creation of those rights. Standing alone, the fact that a new burden
would be imposed could not possibly justify the nonrecognition of
restrictive covenant rights. 5 Private parties can and do create new
compensable rights through grants of easements and there is no
reason why these rights should be compensable, and restrictive
covenant rights not, when "upon condemnation in both situations
the financial burden of the condemner [would be] increased solely
by virtue of agreements made between private parties. 7 6 If this
"new burden" rationale is taken seriously, the state could avoid
compensating landowners for any improvements made upon their
land as well.
The fourth justification for non-compensation is related to the
third. The concern is that not only would a new burden be created
by recognizing covenant rights as property, but recognition would
entail the payment of damages that have heretofore been consid-
ered noncompensable. 7 These so-called consequential damages re-
present the depreciation in the value of property caused when
nearby property is put to a public use, and are generally consid-
ered noncompensable. 7' The consequential damage rule would ap-
pear to be out of place in this context, however, because the cove-
nants create a legally recognizable interest in the land taken and
"make direct . . . the damages which otherwise would be
consequential." 79
74. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. McNeill, 381 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ark. 1964).
75. Although the Florida Supreme Court does not explicitly voice this concern, some
minority view courts have expressed a fear that landowners would impose a new burden in
bad faith. However, this concern was answered by the California Supreme Court in South-
ern California Edison Co. when it stated that "the speculative possibility that some unduly
acquisitive landowners might in bad faith enter into restrictive covenants . . . would not
justify the denial of compensation to all property owners. . . ." Furthermore, as the court
points out, courts have the power to deny compensation upon a finding of bad faith. 507
P.2d at 968.
76. Id. at 966 (footnotes omitted).
77. 81 So. 2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Certain Lands, 112 F. 622, 629).
78. See 2A NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.4432(1) (3d ed. 1981).
79. Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 112 N.E. 913, 914 (N.Y. 1916). See also Brickman,
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In the absence of restrictions a landowner cannot prevent his
neighbor from using his land in ways that may depreciate the value
of his property, except when those uses constitute nuisances.80
Through restrictive covenants, a landowner can protect the value
of his property by prohibiting his neighbor from using his land in
otherwise permissible ways. Moreover, he may, with the benefit of
such covenants, enjoin his neighbor without having to prove actual
depreciation in the market value of his property. 1 It is this
right-the right to enjoin a neighbor from using his land in other-
wise permissible ways-that is taken when the sovereign acquires
the burdened land and it is for this "taking" that the beneficiaries
of covenants seek compensation. When the burdened land is ac-
quired for public purposes, the rights are destroyed. There is noth-
ing indirect about this damage.
The fifth justification expressed by the court in Bay Harbor is
that if the courts were "to recognize a right of compensation in
[these] instances, it would place upon the public an intolerable
burden wholly out of proportion to any conceivable benefits to
those who might be entitled to compensation. 8 2 Assuming that
compensation will approximate value taken, the court's inference
that the owners of restrictive covenant rights are benefited insig-
nificantly by existence of the rights would, if true, simply defeat
any argument that the substantive burden would be "intolerable."
However, it is often the case that covenant rights are extremely
valuable. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the substantive
burden would be out of proportion to the benefits received from
covenant rights when compensation would be determined by a rel-
atively objective measure-the difference in the fair market value
of the benefited tenements before and after the burdened land is
acquired."
The real concern of the courts is that, in their view, the substan-
tive and procedural burdens would, in many instances, be so great
that as a practical matter governmental bodies would be prevented
from exercising their eminent domain powers. In situations where
The Compensability of Restrictive Covenants in Eminent Domain, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 147,
169 (1960).
80. Reaver v. Martin Theatres, 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951); Preston v. Schrenk, 295 P.2d
272 (Idaho 1956).
81. 5 R. Powell, Real Property § 676 (1949).
82. 81 So. 2d at 643 (footnotes ommited).
83. See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.73(1) (3d ed. 1981).
84. 81 So. 2d at 643.
19831
680 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:667
there are only a few benefited tenements, this concern would seem
unwarranted for even if the covenant rights were quite valuable to
their individual owners, the aggregate amount to be compensated
could not reach a prohibitive figure. With few potential litigants,
the additional procedural burdens are also likely to be small. The
additional burden in these situations would simply be another cost
for the public body to consider in choosing the particular lot to be
acquired. In this manner land is put to its optimum use.
It is only in situations where there are many covenant benefi-
ciaries that the "intolerable burden" argument appears warranted.
As expressed in Bay Harbor:
In the event of the construction of a public building in a large
subdivision containing many separate ownerships, a determina-
tion of the varying degrees of damage, if any, which might be
claimed by the individual lot owners would present obstacles of
an unwarranted nature in the exercise of the sovereign power."5
While the concern expressed above was with procedural burdens,
courts have also been concerned with the substantive burdens
which arise where there are a large number of potential claim-
ants.86 However, in such a situation, it is unlikely that all lots
would be harmed by a public use acquisition. In fact, the owners of
lots not in the immediate vicinity of the acquired land may actu-
ally be benefited. For example, in the case of a fire station, "it can
well be said that little difficulty would be experienced with those
whose lots are not in close proximity to the proposed site. '8 7 Even
if a large number of lot owners suffer a technical loss, as a practical
matter, the number of claimants is not likely to be overwhelming
since: (1) "As the distance of the claimant's lot from the invaded
tract increased, the amount of compensation would rapidly dimin-
ish, soon to the vanishing point,""' and (2) those who hold small
claims are likely to find that it would not, as a practical matter, be
worth pressing their claims or, in any event, they may be expected
to settle out of court for nominal amounts.89
85. 81 So. 2d at 643-44.
86. City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
87. Allen v. City of Detroit, 133 N.W. 317, 321 (Mich. 1911).
88. Aigler, supra note 49, at 32.
89. As far as costs of condemnation proceedings, including reasonable attorney's fees, are
concerned, Florida law presently requires they be paid by the condemning authority. FLA.
STAT. § 73.091 (1981). One commentator has suggested that this statute be modified in the
case of restrictive covenants. Brickman, supra note 79, at 168. •
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Specifically regarding the procedural burdens, a number of ap-
proaches may be taken to limit the burden that would befall the
public. One suggestion that has been made is that the requirement
of serving notice could be met through publication. e A Florida
statute presently allows for notice by publication in eminent do-
main proceedings where the property owner is not a resident of the
state or if personal service cannot be had "for any other reason." 1
Where personal service can be had, notice by publication may be
insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.92 Nevertheless, in
the typical subdivision situation, providing notice directly to bene-
fited lot owners would appear to be a simple and inexpensive thing
to accomplish. Interested lot owners can be ascertained from pub-
lic records and delivery of notice could be accomplished easily be-
cause the lot owners would all be living together in what is usually
a well-defined neighborhood. Another suggestion is that a portion
of the costs of condemnation proceedings could be assessed to
claimants whose claims are deemed frivolous.'3 As far as the deter-
mination of damages is concerned, a special master could be ap-
pointed to provide courts with recommendations. Also, the burden
of proving damages could be placed upon the condemnees.
While heavy burdens, both substantive and procedural, may
arise in certain instances, one commentator nevertheless noted
that "the constitutional guarantee of compensation does not ex-
tend only to cases where the taking is cheap or easy."'" Certainly,
in terms of fairness, it would be more fair to spread the costs over
the public, for whose benefit the burdened land has been acquired,
than to place them all upon the shoulders of a small group of pri-
vate property owners.
III. THE MAJORITY VIEW: THE NATURE OF RESTRICTIONS
The courts subscribing to the majority view take a more logical
approach to this issue. Instead of simply labeling restrictive cove-
90. Id. at 166.
91. FLA. STAT. § 73.031 (1951).
92. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950); In Walker, a portion of the appellant's land was condemned. Although the ap-
pellant's name was known to the city and was contained in official records, the only notice
given was by publication in a city newspaper. The court held that under such circumstances,
notice by publication was insufficient to meet due process requirements. 352 U.S. at 116.
93. Brickman, supra note 79, at 168.
94. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of Another, 56
IOWA L. Rxv. 293, 307 (1970).
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nant rights, they look instead at their nature. These courts resolve
the issue as follows:
Why should a party receive compensation for an easement right
which enhances the value of his property and yet be denied com-
pensation for a right obtained by a restrictive covenant which
similarly adds to the value of his holdings? Both interests are di-
rectly connected to the land and we are unable to find a distinc-
tion between them which will justify dissimilar treatment at the
hands of a condemning authority."'
The rule followed by all American jurisdictions is that legally
recognizable easements are property rights that must be compen-
sated for when taken by a public authority.96 Thus, if there are no
significant distinctions between restrictive covenant rights and
these other easements, logic would dictate that they be treated as
property rights. In fact, even the courts subscribing to the minority
view seem to concede that the rights created by restrictive cove-
nants are, in effect, negative easements.97 The only distinction
these courts allude to is that restrictive covenant rights rest upon
contract law, while easements have their roots imbedded in the
common law of property.98 The Florida Supreme Court and the
other minority view courts rely on this technical distinction not so
much as a rationalization, for the courts do not explain just what
significance this distinction has, but as a convenient excuse for de-
nying compensation based upon public policy concerns.99
IV. CONCLUSION
While an examination of the nature of restrictive covenants
would seem to be the most important step in determining whether
the rights they create are, in fact, "property," the Florida Supreme
Court, like the other courts subscribing to the minority view, does
not take this approach. Instead its contention, put in simple terms,
is that it would cost too much to recognize these rights as property.
95. Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1960).
96. 2 NICHOLS, supra note 83, at § 5.72. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(b) provides: "Provision
may be made by law for the taking of easements . . ." See also Glessner v. Duval County,
203 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967); City of Miami Beach v. Belle Isle Apartment Corp., 177
So. 2d 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
97. One court has conceded that restrictions were, in fact, "property" even though it
held them noncompensable. Arkansas State Highway Comm'w v. McNeill, 381 So. 2d at 427.
98. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.40 (1952).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 60 and 61.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
This assessment has been based not on actual fact patterns
presented to the courts but on hypothetical situations that are not
likely to occur with any substantial frequency. 00 The fact that
many jurisdictions have long subscribed to the majority position,
allowing compensation where restrictive rights are destroyed, evi-
dences that such situations happen infrequently or when they do
occur, do not present the difficulties advanced by the minority
view.' 01 Meanwhile, in frequently occurring situations, the benefi-
ciaries of restrictive covenants are having what can only be deemed
property rights destroyed without the compensation constitution-
ally guaranteed them.
In Ryan v. Town of Manalapan, the supreme court had the op-
portunity to reexamine its minority view position and, at the very
least, could have limited the scope of its Bay Harbor holding to
those situations where public bodies initiate the plan whereby land
burdened by restrictive covenants is acquired. The court did
neither, and as a result, beneficiaries of restrictive covenants find
their rights not only vulnerable to public plans of development,
but to private plans as well. Furthermore, judging from the infre-
quency with which these cases are reviewed by the supreme court,
it is unlikely that that court will be reexamining its stance in the
foreseeable future.
THOMAS CONRAD
100. In a frequently cited passage, a Texas court advanced a 10,000 lot hypothetical.
City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
101. For example, Michigan has subscribed to the majority view for over 70 years. Allen
v. City of Detroit, 133 N.W. 317 (Mich. 1911).
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